This is part of a larger project I am working on. These are just raw reactions to the text as I read it. For the final discussion, check out my Substack.
Athens’ army was below the walls of Syracuse, Sicily’s most powerful city. The Athenians had constructed walls around it, but who was really besieging who? The Syracusans had built their own walls at a right angle to the Athenian fortifications. They had nearly cut Athens off from their fleet in the Great Harbor of Syracuse. Athenian supplies were running low. It was the greatest expedition ever launched by Athens, and it did not seem to be powerful enough. Even worse for the Athenians, their enemies in the Peloponnese were finally able to respond to the Athenian attack on Sicily.
The Spartan government ordered their general Gylippus to sail for Syracuse at the head of a small force of hoplites. Corinth also sortied its fleet to try and tie down Athenian naval assets in Greece. Even if they lost these in battle, it would be worth it, so long as they created the opportunity for a decisive result in Sicily. The primary Peloponnesian army also marched into Attica, and unlike in the previous two decades of attacks, stayed throughout the year behind fieldworks, launching raids constantly into Athenian territory.
Despite this, Athens doubled down on the attack on Sicily, dispatching Demosthenes and a relief force of triremes and hoplites. Once he arrived, he attacked the Syracusan lines right away, driving them back. However, Gylippius led an inspired night attack, preventing the Athenians from consolidating their gains and destroying their supply caches.
The Athenian commanders debated what to do. Demosthenes advocated immediate departure. They could return home, arguing they had achieved naval superiority in Sicily and shown that Athens could launch raids over long distances. He believed it was better to cut their losses now before real damage occurred. However, Nicias disagreed. He feared the democracy in Athens. It would never blame itself for launching the ill-advised expedition. The generals would become scapegoats. They had no choice but to press on, the people had spoken.
As the Athenians debated, the Syracusans managed to almost close the Great Harbor completely. If they could do that, the Syracusans would have the Athenian fleet, the bulk of Athens’ imperial naval assets, trapped. The Athenians ordered as many soldiers as possible onto their ships to serve as marines and attacked. In the close confines of the harbor, Athenian naval skill and finesse was useless. The Syracusans overwhelmed the Athenian fleet in a straight on slugfest as the rest of the Athenian army watched helplessly from shore.
Over the next few days, the Athenian army tried to escape overland to any city that would take them in and help them escape to Athens. Syracusan cavalry and light infantry harassed them constantly, making sure they had no access to more food and water as they marched. The Syracusans killed or captured the entire Athenian army.
It had been the largest, most costly, expedition that Athens had ever built. The Athenians then doubled down on their bet and sent even more soldiers and ships. Now everything was gone. How could Athens possible recover from such a defeat and what would happen to their empire if they did not?
If you’re interested in the final discussion of the book, check out my Substack.
The History Doctor 
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