This is part of a larger project I am working on. These are just raw reactions to the text as I read it. For the final discussion, check out my Substack.
Tacitus’ Annals closes with the reign of the emperor Nero. He ascended to the throne after the death, possibly murder, of his adopted father, Claudius. Like the other early emperors, such as Tiberius, Nero’s time was largely devoted to court politics and retention of power in Rome. This was a paranoid style of leadership that saw conspiracies and treachery around every corner, often times rightfully so.
In terms of foreign affairs, Nero continued the imperial precedent of policing the existing borders, keeping satellite powers on the frontier weak and pliable, and only engaging in limited expeditions to preserve the status quo antebellum. The best of example of this was during yet another war against the Parthians in the Roman east. The Parthians invaded Armenia, attempting to place a Parthian-friendly king on the throne. However, unlike previous times, they not only attacked through the mountains of eastern Anatolia, they also struck at Roman Syria, trying to split Rome’s ability to respond. Unfortunately, for the Parthians, the Roman commander on the scene was highly competent and used the mountainous terrain in Armenia to his defensive advantage while going on the operational offensive in Syria, striking across the Euphrates River and establishing positions on the Parthian side of the border. Nero then used these advances while negotiating a peace and for the disbandment of these Roman positions.
Nero’s paranoia and near constant focus on the politics of Rome itself meant that governors in the periphery had to operate in a vacuum at times, without clear commander’s intent. Sometimes, this could mean that worthy projects might not be undertaken by leaders worried they might bring on the wrath or paranoia of the emperor, such as when the governor of what’s now Belgium refused to allow large scale public works projects that would require bringing in legions from neighboring provinces. He worried that if word got back to Rome that troops were assembling in his province, Nero would think that the governor was amassing forces for a rebellion against him.
However, this lack of direction or oversight could also go the other direction and cause rebellions, such as in Britain, where the excesses of the Roman governor and colonizing Roman army veterans so outraged the local Britons that Rome nearly lost control of the island. Nero weighed in on the most important political decisions but was nowhere to be found for the day to day administration of the empire, constantly worried about retaining his power.
This paranoia, and the harsh actions he took trying to deal with suspected dissidents, merely caused more descension and made his position more unstable. Eventually, tired of him, the army rebelled. He committed suicide fleeing capture and his overthrowal ushered in the Year of the Four Emperors, as various generals fought with each other to become the new Emperor of Rome.
A moody and paranoid leader, Nero exhibited all of the hallmark weaknesses of the imperial system. It was dependent on the person in charge actually being competent. Without that, the whole system, at best, puttered along not proactively finding solutions to new problems and allowing them to fester into larger issues. At worst, the leaders were actively detrimental to the good governance of the empire and feared competent subordinates as threats to the imperial crown.
If you’re interested in the final discussion of the book, check out my Substack.
The History Doctor 
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