This is part of a larger project I am working on. These are just raw reactions to the text as I read it. For the final discussion, check out my Substack.
In Plutarch’s biographies of Pelopidas and Marcellus, we read an examination about the proper role of high-level military leaders in warfare. At the lower levels of combat, or in armies that conducted more simple tactics, good leaders took their place where the battle would be most difficult, either because of physical danger or complication of action. Given the limited abilities for command and control in these armies, this made sense. Once the general drew up his battleplan, there was little he could do to affect its outcome other than provide some morale boost at the probable point of decision by his physical presence. However, as warfare grew more complex in Greek and Roman societies, there was a question of if generals should be more removed from the frontlines so that they could better observe the overall action and direct reserves, realign forces, etc. For Plutarch, Pelopidas and Marcellus were examples of leaders of enormous potential whose lives were cut short because they would not trust subordinates to do their jobs.
Pelopidas was a Theban from Boeotia, born in the period between the Peloponnesian War and the Macedonian conquest of Greece. The Thebes of his day was occupied by the Spartans, who were back in a dominant position in the Greek world after their defeat of Athens. Pelopidas yearned for a free Thebes and led a resistance against the Spartans.
He was at times the leader of all Theban forces, at others “only” the commander of the Theban Sacred Band, an elite formation within the Theban army. He famously would accept subordinate positions without quarrel, always trying to do what was best for the community. Together with his colleague, Epaminondas, they rolled back Spartan power and struck deep into the Peloponnese, making Thebes the dominant power in the Greek world for a time.
However, trouble was already starting to brew between Macedon and Greece. The Thebans sent Pelopidas north with a relief force into Thessaly to try and keep out Macedonian incursions, but the Macedonian king captured and mistreated him. He was later released, sent to Persia on an ambassadorial mission, and then deployed to Thessaly again against the Macedonians.
While in battle with his forces, he spied the Macedonian king himself on the battlefield, and Pelopidas charged towards him. He died trying to kill the Macedonian king, his army collapsed because of his death, and, eventually, Macedon conquered Greece.
The first time Marcellus was one of the consuls of Rome was in between the two Punic Wars. He led the Romans against the Celts living in what is now the Italian Piedmont. During the war, he fought in single combat against the Celtic king, killing him, and routing the Celtic forces despite the Romans having a smaller army.
Later, during the Second Punic War, Marcellus was frequently consul or proconsul alongside Fabius. Whereas Fabius was slow and deliberate, Marcellus was always trying to gain the initiative and go on the offensive. Supposedly, Hannibal said that he always worried about what Fabius would do to stop Hannibal’s actions and what he would have to do to stop Marcellus’.
The war against Cartage in general, and Hannibal specifically, took many years, and involved numerous theatres of operations. It was easily the largest conflict Rome had conducted up to that point. Marcellus also served in Sicily, besieging a Syracuse defended by Archimedes and his many elaborate machines built to keep the Romans out.
When back in Italy operating against Hannibal’s army, Marcellus took his senior generals and fellow consul out on a scouting mission that any cavalry force in the army would have been capable of conducting. They were ambushed by Carthaginian cavalry and whipped out. The entire Roman command structure died needlessly.
In both the case of Pelopidas and Marcellus, we see leaders who had to deal with warfare evolving right under their feet during their own lives. Both Thebes and Rome had to contend with larger, more complex military operations, its leaders needed to understand that their place was not always on the front lines or doing standard reconnaissance patrols like they were junior officers. Both Marcellus and Pelopidas failed to understand they were no longer war leaders or military chieftains, but officers of soldiers in increasingly complicated systems of organization.
If you’re interested in the final discussion of the book, check out my Substack.
The History Doctor 
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