The History Doctor

This is part of a larger project I am working on. These are just raw reactions to the text as I read it. For the final discussion, check out my Substack.

Book III of Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War covers the years 428-425. In these years, we begin to see an ideological struggle emerging as both sides of the conflict jockey for allies and advantages in a conventional conflict that has begun to stalemate. The Peloponnesians sought out oligarchic elites in democratic-run cities under Athenian control, and the Athenians encouraged democratic forces in cities under Peloponnesian influence, which tended to be oligarchic in their governance.

Thucydidean-authored debates over the morality of conflict and the use of force are major components of this section of the book. His debates settle on a very realpolitik approach, not from a perspective of it was the best method, but from the idea that it just is an unpleasant reality. Following the Athenians putting down a revolt at Mytilene, Athens debated what they should do with the Mytilenians. The winning side argues that that should show the Mytilenians clemency so as not to back dissidents into a corner and encouraging desperate all-out resistance, it being cheaper to induce them to surrender early. Similarly, as the Spartans were deciding what to do about captured Plataeans after the fall of their city, they decided to put the Plataeans to death, at the request of Thebes. Frankly, Thebes was more useful to the Spartans than Plataea was, the Spartans explained, they were all just trying to survive and Sparta stood a better chance with Thebes on its side.

We also see foreshadowing of larger later decisions that will be Athens’ downfall. As the conflict spreads across the Hellenic world, Sicily and southern Italy began to have localized disputes between democratic and authoritarian factions. This was intriguing for Athens because a chance to get involved in Sicily and being able to take it over would provide Athens with a tremendous new source of power. On a smaller scale, the opportunity arose for Athens to strike north from Naupactus, on the Gulf of Corinth, into Boeotia. Local tribes, not happy with Theban dominance, encouraged Athens to support them and thus knock Thebes out of the war, securing Attica’s northern border. However, this required the Athenian general Demosthenes to take a hoplite army deep into the interior of Boeotia, away from the support of the Athenian navy and along a narrow supply line. Theban-aligned Boeotian skirmishers harassed the Athenian army and forced it back. Athens did not do well when it abandoned playing to its strengths. It was not a land power, and extended operations there were dangerous for their forces.

Leaders in both Sparta and Athens warned their constituents that this would be a long war. It seems only in the third through fifth years of the conflict that most really began to understand what that would mean, and frustration was starting to build up as both sides looked for ways to end the war faster.

If you’re interested in the final discussion of the book, check out my Substack.